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Abstract—Malware  are  typically  known  through  extensive 
publicity  in  the  media  when  incidents  such  as  infection  by 
Conficker  on  the  computers  around  the  globe.  Such  Malware 
infects  all  who  are  vulnerable  to  its  bite.  However  there  is 
another form of Malware lurking which is not reported in any 
media,  nor  does  it  attack  everybody.  It  targets  only s p e c i f i c  
individuals and organizations. This form of Malware is seeking 
to achieve focused objectives rather than to drawing fame onto 
itself. The Malware is able to circumvent even the best practices 
used in security defences. Anti-Malware solutions are available 
but can be ineffective against them. The development approach 
to such Malware has evolved towards a bespoke development. 
Investigators and analysts of Malware face a great challenge in 
studying  and  combating  against  these  Malware.  This  paper 
serves  to  expose  such  practices  and  to  initiate  discussions  and 
strategies in order to develop counter-measure solutions that are 
urgently needed in the world of e-Business before the community 
is totally succumbed by this type of Boutique Malware. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Malware  is  becoming  a  major  problem  to  the  global 
computing  community  -  from  users  around  the  world  to 
astronauts i n  s p a c e .  Most  Malwares  are  used  by 
cybercriminals to conduct their criminal activities. According 
to FBI, the global hacker’s economy is worth more than USD 
10 billion annually [1] and Malware is a key contributor to 
this economy. In order to manage this malice and its negative 
impacts,  there  are  numerous  defensive  approaches  that 
organizations would typically adopt in order to safeguard their 
IT  assets.  There  are  the  anti-virus  solutions,  intrusion 
detection and prevention systems, and other forms of layered 
security  measures.  However,  there  is  an  arsenal  from t h e  
cybercriminal  community  that  seems  to  be  giving  them  an 
advantage. Unlike notorious mass attacks induced by highly 
publicized Malwares, this new form of Malware is conducting 
discrete attacks on specific organizations or individuals. Their 
goal  is  to  minimize  publicity  in  order  to  achieve  their 
malicious  intent o n  specific  target o r  t a r g e t s .  The  trend 
towards using such targeted Malware is growing from year to 
year. It started notably in 2005, with a number of reported 
attacks made to government organizations [4]. In 2008, more 
targeted attacks were launched. An example is an attack made 
against Hannaford Bros [5], grocery stores in New England 
USA. Four million of their credit and debit card numbers were 
stolen by a Malware developed specifically for them and to 
circumvent their security measures. According to a research 
group, such targeted Malware attacks is becoming a norm now 
[32].  A  new  definition  for  such  form  of  Malware  is  called 
Advanced  Persistent  Threat  (or  APT)  which  takes  its  root 
from  the  military  sector  [33].  This  form  of  Malware  is  a 
notable change from the ‘write-once-attack-all’ approach that 
seeks  to  infect  as  many  as  possible  towards  a  ‘write-once-
attack-one’ approach of where damage caused from the cyber 
assault  is  focused.  An  analogy  to  conventional  weaponry 
would be smart bombs over conventional bombs. In this paper, 
this form of Malware is termed as “Boutique Malware” as we 
are  looking  specifically  into  its  focused  attributes.  In  this 
survey paper, the notable characteristics are discussed in the 
next  section.  The  subsequent  section,  Section  III,  will  look 
into  the  effectiveness  of  the  current  countermeasures  with 
recommendations  proposed.  This  is  then  followed  by  the 
research  advancement  considerations  and  finally  the 
conclusion. 
II.  BOUTIQUE MALWARE 
Boutique Malware has a number of unique characteristics 
when compared to conventional Malware. It has the following 
features: 
 
a.  Targeted strategy 
b.  Bespoke development approach  
c.  Narrowly focused approach to infect the targeted 
d.  Customized attack techniques used to suit environment 
A. Targeted Strategy 
Today, records show that only amateur hackers are getting 
caught by the police [1]. Professional cybercriminals are using 
subtle  approaches  in  their  Malware  infections  and  attacks. 
They are kept intentionally elusive to stay below the radar of 
the security and law enforcement communities. To stay totally 
evasive as long as possible is a key objective [2]. It would be a 
mission failure if the Malware gained fame and publicity. The 
Malware also is required to slip through cracks found in the 
multiple layers of defences to get to its target. Mission goals 
are typically financial gains or politically motivated objectives 
rather than fame.  
Boutique Malware focuses on specific targets. They include 
government  entities  [18],  schools  [13],  banks  [7],  military 
organizations [14], political entities, [15] corporate CEO [16] 
and other high salaried workers at selected corporations [17]. 
Such  Malware  also  targets  specific  type  of  users t h a t  a r e  
associated with the targeted organization. An example is the 
customers doing online banking with specific bank or banks 
[19]. 
  B. Bespoke Development Approach 
The design of such Malware is more elaborate compared to 
the  common  wild  fire  Malware.  A  customized  based 
development approach is used to develop Boutique Malware. 
According to Horenbeeck [4], these tailored made Malware 
are developed in the following manner. 
a.  Identify  the  specific  actors  involved  including  the 
targeted. 
b.  Find  logical  associations  between  communities 
which the identified actors associate with often. 
c.  Gather information about the actor's reputation in the 
community,  their  interests  and c o n t a c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
through the activity they generate online. 
d.  Design  and  develop  the  Malware  to  infiltrate  the 
actor’s protected space and information store. 
e.  Send the uniquely developed Malware to the targeted 
and deceive the latter into installing the Malware. 
Such sequence of activities is similar to the techniques used 
by  hackers  as  part  of  their  hacking  cycle.  The  extensive 
amount  of  reconnaissance  done  on  the  targeted  to  identify 
vulnerabilities and operating patterns would incur more time 
and  effort i n  t h e  d e v e l o p me n t  o f  Bo u t i q u e  Ma l wa r e  d e s i g n  
than the typical Malware [2]. Schouwenberg [6], who did a 
study into Boutique Malware that targeted banks, noted that 
such Malware are modifications or derivatives of a common 
species  or  past  variants  of  Malware.  They  were  custom 
designed  to  infect  its  targeted  then  manoeuvre  around  the 
bank’s  security  defences.  A  group  of  researchers  recently 
discovered a targeted Malware compromising of over 87,000 
Malware variants [31]. Boutique Malware is creating a new 
form  of  business  for  Malware  developers  from  creating 
Malware  for  the  masses  to  bespoke  Malware  where  the 
finished  product  is  custom  made  to  operate  ‘effectively’ 
within the target’s operating environment. 
C. Narrowly Focused Infection Approach 
The infection vector used in such Malware is focused on 
specific  persons  or  group  of  interest.  Here  the  intent  is  to 
infiltrate  the  target’s  operating  environment.  However  such 
targets  would  likely  have  a  comprehensive  set  of  defence 
measures  in  place  to  protect  them.  Boutique  Malware  are 
adapted  to  slip  through  the  layers  of  defences.  Targeted 
deceive techniques are used. For example, they use specific 
references  to  address  their  targets t o  d e c e i v e  t h e  t a r g e t s .  
References like name, title and company name of the targeted 
are used. According to Germain [17], it seems unlikely that 
emails used in such malicious attack are automatically sent by 
software  bots.  Such  targeted  phishing  attacks  made  by 
cybercriminals  against  specific  individuals  or  entities  are 
known as Spear-phishing. Such forms of social engineering 
attacks are not easily detectable [20]. Such assaults may result 
in the victim not being aware that a breach has even occurred 
as the activity may be deemed legitimate by the victim.  
The  key  notable  characteristics  of  specific  infection 
strategy used include: 
a.  Specific  references  that  uses  knowledge  of  the 
personal  information  of  a  specific  individual  or 
organization [21].  
b.  The focus is on individuals or organizations within a 
specific region [7] with language localization made 
to  the  malicious  communiqué  sent  to  the  targeted 
[13].  
c.  Timing  on  the  execution  of  infection  attempt  is 
deliberately chosen. An example is malicious emails 
being sent on weekends instead of weekdays [18].  
d.  Specific infection tools or platform that best suits the 
targeted  are u s e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  u s i n g  M i c r o s o f t  
Office exploits with Microsoft Word and Microsoft 
Powerpoint documents [18].  
e.  Use of social engineering techniques to deceive the 
victim into thinking that the email is legitimate [17]. 
An  example  is  to  falsify  the  origins  of  the  email 
indicate that it is from a government entity.  
In  order  to  minimize  the  chances  of  the  Malware  from 
being  detected,  cybercriminals  are  evolving  their  infection 
vector to the next level. They now deploy their Malware in 
websites and have their victims surf those websites [6], this is 
known as drive-by download.  
Malware is not only specifically targeting those in it intends 
to infect, it is also avoiding those it does not intend to. The 
early  variant  of  Conficker  (Conficker  A)  will  abstain  from 
attacking any computer who had an Ukrainian Keyboard [22]. 
Also it would prevent itself from attacking any hosts with an 
Ukraine’s IP addresses based on GeoIP database [23]. 
D. Customized Attack Approach 
The  types  of  attacks  used  by  Boutique  Malware  are 
customized to suit the environment that it needs to operate to 
achieve its objectives. Here the intent is to have the attack 
adapted to suit the operating environment of the targeted to 
avoid  detection  while  maximizing  effectiveness.    One  such 
example  is  the  Trojan  Horse  software,  named 
Trojan.SilentBanker, that specifically targets banking systems 
with two factor authentication. The Trojan’s attack intent is to 
capture  specific  sensitive  data  like  names,  passwords  and 
account information [17]. Over 400 banks are at risks due to 
this Trojan [24]. 
The technique of attack that is commonly used by Boutique 
Malware is known as Man-In-The-Endpoint (MitE) where the 
malicious control occurs at the client or local system of the 
victim.  This  is  different  from  the  notorious  Man-In-The-
Middle (MitM) attack technique where the interception occurs 
within  the  connectivity  path  between  two  endpoints.  The 
focus  of  this  MitE  is  to  perform  the  malicious  act  prior  to 
entering into the secure HTTPS tunnel[6]. One example is the 
banking  Malware  that  will  modify  the  transactions  made 
online and send the redirected transfer of funds to an account 
that  attacker  has  control  over.  The  funds  are  subsequently 
retrieved by cybercriminal through the use of money mules. 
Another  is  to  secretly  insert  an  extra  transaction  when  the 
victims’  transacts  online  and  change  the  order  of  the 
transactions in order not to arouse suspicion [6].  III. COUNTERMEASURES 
Security  professionals  and  researchers  have  developed 
many  solutions  and  processes  to  fend  off  Malware  attacks. 
There  are  the  Anti-Virus  solutions,  the  layered  defence 
strategy and malware analysis that aids in the development of 
such defensive solutions. However more work are needed to 
deal with Boutique Malware. 
A. Anti-Virus Solutions 
One  of  the  most  popular w a y s  t o  e r a d i c a t e  m a licious 
software is the use of Anti-Virus products. Such products are 
developed  from  information  or  data  gathered  from  past 
Malware attacks and analyses. Signatures are developed and 
updated  into  their  products  through  signature  updates. 
However A U S C E R T  r e c k o n s  t h a t  8 0 %  o f  t h e  Anti-Virus 
solutions are ineffective in detecting and removing Malware 
[12]. In a report by MessageLab, it noted that out of 31 Anti-
Virus c o m p anies,  only  6  recognized  the  malicious  file  to 
contain  a  Malware  [18].  According  another  report  by 
Cyveillance [11] a company that does cyber intelligence, they 
reported that a test conducted on thirteen popular Anti-Virus 
solutions found that such solutions could detect less than half 
of the latest Malware threats identified by the company. The 
report  further  commented  that  these  anti-malware  solutions 
were dependent on their knowledge of the existence of the 
Malware. Boutique Malware are not being caught effectively 
by trips laid out by Anti-Virus companies. An example is the 
Trojan.Clampi [9] Mal war e whi ch f i r s t  exi s t ed i n 2007 but  
was only in 2009 that the Malware was detected and acted 
upon by Anti-Virus solutions [26]. Kotadia [25] commented 
that if the Malware is targeting only specific individuals or 
organizations  and  it  is  not  wide  spread,  some  Anti-Virus 
companies are less inclined to produce signature updates for 
them. Boutique Malware could qualify itself to be a zero-day 
Malware for a prolonged period if the Malware is able to stay 
away  from  the  radars  from  Anti-Virus c o m p a n i e s .  Another 
challenge posed to Anti-Virus solutions is the pace in which 
Malware  developers  change  or  upgrade  their  software  to 
evade  detection. A n  e x a m p l e  o f  o n e  s u c h  M alware  is  the 
Trojan.SilentBanker  [8],  the  percentage  of  this  financial 
Malware being detected was dropping month by month and 
this fall could be caused by undetectable variants.  
Germain [17] advocates that behaviour based or intelligent 
forms  Anti-Virus  technologies  are  needed  to  combat  such 
targeted Malware instead of the signature based ones which 
are  dependent  on  the  signature  database  being  adequately 
updated. I n t e l l i g e n t  i n t r u s i o n  d e t e c t ion  and  prevention 
systems  are  commercially  available  to  sift  out  undesired 
behaviours rather beyond known threats. 
B. Layered Security Defence 
The  most  popular  form  of  security  defences  against 
Malware and hackers is to use layered defences or defence in 
depth strategy. However given the unique characteristics of 
such  Malware w i t h  i t s  c u s t o m i z e d  a t t e m p t s  t o  c i r c u m v e n t  
security defences, Protas [5] advocates constant evaluation of 
the security posture. Layered defences should be viewed as an 
integrated  defence  structure  rather  than  being  viewed 
individually.  Protas  further  advocates  having  the  ability  to 
correlate security events from the various layers of security 
defences to detect such Boutique Malware that may have slip 
through  the  layers.  Security  Information  Management  tools 
could be used for such intent. 
Many organizations conduct vulnerability and penetration 
assessments  on  their  ICT  infrastructure  and  applications  to 
ensure  robustness  against  possible  attacks.  Such  security 
assessments  are  effective  in  tightening  the  security  layers 
against  possible  attacks  by  Boutique  Malware.  Another 
assessment approach can further evaluate the security posture 
and to identify possible gaps is to use a Malware simulator. 
An example of such simulator is MalSim [29].  
The best way to combat Boutique Malware is to educate the 
potential targets, that is, the end user [27]. Also, users can be 
constrained  from  overriding  security  rules  like  installing  of 
software to minimize infection risks [20]. 
C. Malware Analysis 
The effectiveness of any Anti-Virus and layered defence 
solutions  requires  having  good  knowledge  of  such  form  of 
Malware.  This  comes  in  the  form  of  Malware  Analysis  or 
Malware Analysis reports.  
 
Figure 1 – Malware Analysis 
 
However the  analysis  of such  novel  Malware  is  a  major 
challenge [3] for investigators, anti-Malware developers and 
researchers. Firstly they are constantly changing or upgrading 
their  software.  Secondly,  Boutique  Malware, l i k e  o t h e r s  
advanced  Malware,  are  continually  adapting  their 
implementation approaches to prevent detection and analysts. 
Finally, the greatest challenge posed to Malware Analysts is 
the lack of Boutique Malware samples available for analysis 
to be done. 
IV. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The key area for future research against Boutique Malware 
is to develop an effective mechanism to detect the infection of 
such  unique  malicious  software.  If  these  Malware  can  be 
detected  and  its  behavior  analyzed  subsequently,  then 
mitigation plans can be developed to contain the Malware and 
minimize its risk impacts. Another area to develop is to have a highly adaptive and flexible defense structure that will include 
containment measures to counter the Boutique Malware. Such 
structure will need to be automated in order to adapt quickly 
to  close  the  gaps  exploited  and  to  intelligently  sift  out 
anomalies  from  the  seeming  regularities  while  keeping  the 
number of false positives or negatives low.  
Our  research  project  focuses  on  the  containment  of 
potential Malware attacks. According to Verizon’s 2010 Data 
Investigation Breach Report [34], it is noted that typically it 
takes minutes for infection but a significantly longer time in 
terms of days to months to contain a Malware infection. This 
poses more risks to the victim in terms of data loss, and loss or 
limited control over the infected computers. The project intent 
is  to  identify  the  key  attributes  of  notoriously  successful 
Malwares that have affected the community. They are then 
used  to  develop  a  solution  that  uses  similar  approaches  to 
counteract and to contain this malice. The project will propose 
and  develop  plans  and  strategies  against  the  identified 
attributes of the Malwares. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From  the  earlier  years  to  the  most  recently,  widely 
publicized  Malware  like  Conficker  and  Storm  were  the 
focused threats that the community needs to deal with. Now a 
new  form  of  Malware  is  surfacing  and  is  being  used 
increasingly.  Like  weapons  used  in  modern  warfare,  such 
Malware  is  evolving  from  weapons  of  mass  destruction  to 
smart bombs that hits specific targets. According to a report 
by Security Park [28], the volume of such Boutique Malware 
will continue to grow yearly. One report advocates a threefold 
increase of such Malware within a year [30]. Two questions to 
consider – could the earlier forms of Malware be a test bed for 
this  new  form  of  Malware?  Are  the  cybercriminals  quietly 
developing arsenals that the community is not ready to defend 
itself against?  
With the Boutique Malware, the Internet connected world 
is dealing with a threat that may originate from anywhere and 
that may exploit yet to be known vulnerabilities. This may be 
the  unknown  risks  that  would  qualify  Donald  Rumsfield’s 
well  known  phrase.  The  IT  community  urgently  needs  to 
develop  measures  to  deal  with  this  risk  before  it  takes  full 
control  and  users  are  not  able  to  detect  or  prevent  it  from 
doing so. 
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